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Abstract
The mental models that humans form of other agents—
encapsulating human beliefs about agent goals, intentions,
capabilities, and more—create an underlying basis for in-
teraction. These mental models have the potential to affect
both the human’s decision making during the interaction and
the human’s subjective assessment of the interaction. In this
paper, we surveyed existing methods for modeling how hu-
mans view robots, then identified a potential method for im-
proving these estimates through inferring a human’s model
of a robot agent directly from their actions. Then, we con-
ducted an online study to collect data in a grid-world environ-
ment involving humans moving an avatar past a virtual agent.
Through our analysis, we demonstrated that participants’ ac-
tion choices leaked information about their mental models of
a virtual agent. We conclude by discussing the implications of
these findings and the potential for such a method to improve
human-robot interactions.
Introduction
Humans are known to form a “Theory of Mind” (ToM) when
interacting with other people that models their knowledge of
other’s beliefs and intentions (Baker et al. 2017). Research
has shown that people are able to perform this inference on
internal states even from low-level action information such
as movement patterns (Bartlett et al. 2019). This may have
implications for human-robot interactions: humans have
been shown to readily anthropomorphize and form mental
models about robots (Mutlu, Roy, and Sˇabanovic´ 2016) and
even behave differently around robots for which they have
different mental models. For instance, humans maintain var-
ied proxemic distances for the same robot based on its like-
ability (Mumm and Mutlu 2011) or its movement strategy
(Mavrogiannis et al. 2019). These results suggest that hu-
mans use some type of ToM when interacting with robots
and that these models may affect human actions around
robots.
If humans form a ToM about robots, we could enable
robots to estimate how a human is affected by a robot by
using second-order mental modeling — a robot forming a
belief over a human’s model of the robot. A robot or agent
might acquire such a model by directly asking a human
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about their mental model of the agent, but this is an intrusive
and potentially inefficient method of gathering information.
Another option is to model the human’s belief updates from
some initial belief state based on their assumed observations,
forming an open-loop model of the human’s beliefs. How-
ever, this assumes knowledge of both what observations the
human is making and, importantly, what their starting belief
about the robot was before the observations began. We hy-
pothesize that information about a human’s mental model of
a robot might be gained from observing the human’s actions,
enabling inference of second-order mental models.
Intuitively, a human’s low-level actions around another
agent (such as a robot) may contain information that could
be used to understand how they internally view the agent.
To further illustrate this idea, consider a scenario in which
people must walk past a robotic arm placing objects into
a box. In this case, the interaction between the human and
robot is quite brief; however, the human’s mental model of
the robot can still affect their choice of actions. If a person
is confident that the robot will not move outside the radius
of the box in the near future, this person may choose a path
that narrowly misses the robot in order to preserve efficiency
of their own movements. Another person that believes the
robot might soon change its task and swings its end effector
to some unknown new location will likely give the robot a
wider berth. In these cases, the humans’ differing models of
the robot agent’s task-based intention and future movements
cause them to choose different actions despite the humans
sharing the same goal.
If humans form mental models of agents, their actions
may contain information that could be used to infer these
models. The question we address in this work is whether
low-level human action choices during human-agent inter-
actions “leak” information (Mutlu et al. 2009) that could
be used in human-robot interactions to allow robots to per-
form Bayesian inference of a second-order ToM model. In
this paper, we describe a framework for actively updating
a belief of a human’s model of an agent based on their ac-
tions. Then, we conduct an online study in which humans
move a virtual character past a virtual “robot” agent and test
our framework’s inference of a person’s model of the virtual
agent from their movement choices during this interaction.
We also use the data from this study to evaluate if our frame-
work improves estimation of the human’s goal. Our results
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show that information can be extracted from these low-level
actions, although inference of mental models directly from
observed actions may be noisy.
Background
This work is part of an emerging body of research focused
on modeling human decision processes by extracting infor-
mation from their actions. In particular, our work builds on
research into human ToM and methods for learning repre-
sentative models.
Modeling Humans for Action Understanding
Prior work has found that correctly predicting human ac-
tions through an understanding of human intent may pro-
duce safer human-robot interactions (Lasota et al. 2017)
and more efficient human-robot teams (Kanno, Nakata, and
Furuta 2003). In addition, Choudhury et al. (2019) found
that robot planning that utilizes a model of human planning
may produce robot plans that generalize better than plans
learned without such a model. Toward this end, past work
has developed methods for predicting human intent based on
low-level human motion (Thompson, Horiuchi, and Kagami
2009; Kelley et al. 2012; Pe´rez-D’Arpino and Shah 2015)
as well as higher-level models of human reasoning based
on modeling social forces (Luber et al. 2010) or using in-
verse planning to explain observed actions (Gray et al. 2005;
Baker, Saxe, and Tenenbaum 2009; Sohrabi, Riabov, and
Udrea 2016).
Instead of directly inferring intent, other approaches per-
form inverse planning on a model of human decision mak-
ing. For example, maximum entropy inverse reinforcement
learning centers around finding the parameterization of a
reward function that best explains a human’s actions, with
the assumption that the human is acting approximately opti-
mally to maximize that reward function (Ziebart et al. 2008).
Other frameworks for modeling human actions incorporate
intention as part of a larger mental model of the human
(Hiatt et al. 2017). The intention-driven dynamics model
(IDDM) developed by Wang et al. (2013) models human in-
tent as a latent variable that affects the transition function
of the environment. Trafton et al. (2013) create a cognitive
architecture for modeling how humans process information,
using this to help robots interacting with humans understand
how humans will complete various tasks. Hiatt, Harrison,
and Trafton (2011) use such an architecture to simulate dif-
ferent beliefs and goals that the human could hold in order to
find which set of beliefs and goals best explain actions taken
by the human that were unexpected by the robot.
Mental models of humans developed to explain human
actions can also model factors in the human mental state
beyond goal or intent. For instance, Reddy, Dragan, and
Levine (2018) infer a human’s internal dynamics model by
assuming suboptimal behaviors when controlling an agent
are a result of incorrect internal dynamics. Herman et al.
(2016) develop a gradient-based method for learning both
the human’s internal dynamics and reward function simul-
taneously. Tabrez, Agrawal, and Hayes (2019) identify is-
sues in a human’s reward function that can then be used to
provide coaching to a human teammate. Individualization
can be done through modeling human psychological factors,
such as personality factors (Bera et al. 2017), grouping peo-
ple into “types” (Nikolaidis et al. 2015), or inferring people’s
navigation strategies (Godoy et al. 2016).
Models of a human’s mental state can also be used to es-
timate a human’s current knowledge or beliefs (Breazeal,
Gray, and Berlin 2009; Talamadupula et al. 2014; Devin and
Alami 2016; Nikolaidis et al. 2017). Bayesian ToM (Baker,
Saxe, and Tenenbaum 2011) models how humans perform
this inference, casting a human as an observer making infer-
ences about an agent’s beliefs and intentions. One example
of this is work by Lee, Sha, and Breazeal (2019) that esti-
mates a child’s belief about a robot’s current state (listening
vs not listening) during a storytelling interaction. Their ap-
proach accomplishes our goal of actively inferring a mental
model, which they achieve through a filtering process that
includes both a forward estimate of the person’s belief af-
ter a new observation and an update based on the person’s
actions. However, their model is an example of a first-order
ToM-based model — forming a model of a person’s belief
about factual knowledge (in this case, the robot’s attentive
state).
Each of these approaches use models of human reason-
ing to explain and predict human actions. An agent utiliz-
ing these models could be said to be practicing first-order
ToM by attributing mental states to a human and model-
ing these states to understand human actions. However, this
kind of modeling does not incorporate humans’ potential
views regarding agents themselves as intelligent actors about
which humans may form a ToM. Our interest is in perform-
ing Bayesian inference of second-order ToM-based models
from human actions around an agent, thereby learning about
a human’s mental model of the agent.
Modeling Humans’ Use of Theory of Mind
Second-order mental modeling relies on the premise that hu-
mans practice first-order ToM by forming mental models
of others. Modeling a human’s use of first-order ToM can
improve understanding of their actions, as demonstrated by
Baker et al. (2017). Further demonstrating this benefit, Jara-
Ettinger et al. (2016) create a computational model of how
humans reason about others’ decision making based on in-
ferring costs and rewards. This principle has been used to
include a ToM in simulation agents, creating better simula-
tions of humans in social scenarios (Pynadath and Marsella
2005; Doshi et al. 2010; Stuhlmu¨ller and Goodman 2014).
Rabinowitz et al. (2018) create a neural network inspired by
ToM that is able to build models of various types of observed
agents which can be used for applications such as predicting
false beliefs. Models incorporating higher-order ToM bet-
ter explain human actions in competitive games than models
not including ToM (Yoshida, Dolan, and Friston 2008), and
modeling how humans reason in multiplayer games can give
insight into how people form social strategies such as coop-
erating or competing (Kleiman-Weiner et al. 2016).
Moving beyond first-order ToM, Yang et al. (2018) found
that using higher-order ToM for policy recognition in com-
petitive games provides an advantage over an opponent us-
ing a lower-order ToM. In line with these findings, hu-
mans tend to use first-order ToM, but can raise this level
based on identifying intelligent opponents that are using
higher-order ToM in competitive games (Doshi et al. 2010;
de Weerd, Verbrugge, and Verheij 2017). In general, explor-
ing beyond first-order ToM has shown that there are some
benefits to humans using second-order ToM in competitive
settings, but there are diminishing returns for higher orders
beyond this (de Weerd, Verbrugge, and Verheij 2014).
In order to perform second-order mental modeling, some
recursive structure must be used to model another agent
modeling oneself (for a survey of the many ways in which
agents can model one another, see Albrecht and Stone
(2018)). Gmytrasiewicz and Durfee (1995) established a
framework for recursive agent models, which were ex-
panded on using techniques for belief updating in these
models (Gmytrasiewicz, Noh, and Kellogg 1998). Gmy-
trasiewicz and Doshi (2005) further developed these ideas
into Interactive Partially Observable Markov Decision Pro-
cesses (I-POMDPs), which provide a principled framework
for finding policies while considering recursive beliefs about
other agents. Following work by Doshi et al. (2012) that
models human recursive reasoning in a game through an I-
POMDP, we leverage the I-POMDP framework to model a
human’s internal planning around an agent.
An existing approach for building second-order mental
models is what we have described above as open-loop men-
tal modeling. Baker and Tenenbaum (2014) use Bayesian
ToM to simulate a human inferring an agent’s goal(s). Huang
et al. (2017) model humans as using Bayesian IRL to learn
about robot objectives, and use this model to plan for ac-
tions that will communicate to the human as desired. Simi-
larly, Mavrogiannis, Thomason, and Knepper (2018) antic-
ipate human modeling of robot motion in order to create
legible navigation strategies. Peltola et al. (2018) use an as-
sumed second-order mental model of a recommender sys-
tem for interpreting feedback from a user, while Gray and
Breazeal (2014) instead use a second-order mental model
in an adversarial manner by planning to fool a human com-
petitor. Such research demonstrates that second-order men-
tal modeling has the potential to improve performance of au-
tonomous systems in interactive settings involving humans.
These prior approaches are open-loop in nature: they use an
assumed human mental model of the robot and update this
model according to the human’s observations of the robot’s
actions, but do not incorporate feedback into their model
from the human’s actions.
The primary idea of our contribution is to create and test
the feasibility of a framework for performing Bayesian in-
ference of our estimate of the human’s mental model of an
agent based on the human’s actions. We do this by fram-
ing the interaction between a human and an agent as an I-
POMDP, then inferring the human’s belief about their in-
teractive state. This allows us to estimate the human’s be-
lief over the space of agent mental models without having to
learn the human’s entire transition function — i.e., we can
model the human’s uncertainty about the agent while still
assuming the human knows the effect of actions on the envi-
ronment. Furthermore, we demonstrate an approach for us-
ing this technique to update our estimate of the human’s goal
or reward function. Thus, our contribution produces both an
estimate of a human’s internal model of another agent and an
estimate of human goals while around this other agent. We
anticipate that this approach could be used to jointly provide
a systematic way to update beliefs about how a human views
a robot during an interaction and improve understanding of
human actions around robots.
Inferring Human Beliefs and Goals from
Actions
In order to approach this problem, we set up an Interactive-
POMDP to model human planning during an interaction. We
apply tools developed for inverse reinforcement learning to
this framework in order to update our beliefs about the hu-
man’s mental model of an agent from observed human ac-
tions. Additionally, we derive a way to use this framework
for estimating human goals while taking into account pos-
sible mental models of the agent that may be affecting their
actions.
Interactive-POMDPs for Model Inference
The I-POMDP framework (Gmytrasiewicz and Doshi 2005)
modifies a POMDP to include other agents by creating
the notion of an interactive state. Interactive states contain
both environmental state and the states (or models) of other
agents. We use a simplified version of an I-POMDP that as-
sumes the environment is fully observed by both agents and
that models of other agents are subintentional models which
are not recursive and instead directly map states to actions.
Formally, let an I-POMDP representing the human’s per-
spective be given by the tuple (IS,A, T,R), where IS =
(S ×M) is a set of interactive states, representing both en-
vironment state s ∈ S and the agent model type attributed
to the other agent mR ∈ M . A is a set of actions a ∈ A
available to both agents, T is the transition function that up-
dates the interactive state given human action aH and agent
action aR via T (s′|s, aH , aR), and R is the human’s reward
function.
Given this framework, our desired contribution is to in-
fer part of the human’s belief about their interactive state.
Specifically, we want to infer mR given an environment
state-action trajectory ξT = [(s1, a1H), ..., (s
T , aTH)]. That
is, after observing ξT during a human-agent interaction, we
want to determine the probability p(mR|ξT ) that a given
mental model is influencing the human’s decision making.
Inferring Human Mental Models of Other Agents
In order to perform inference from this trajectory, we first
model the human’s planning through the state and state-
action value functions of our I-POMDP. We model these
value functions for an interactive state 〈s,mR〉:
V (〈s,mR〉) = maxaH∈AQ(〈s,mR〉, aH) (1)
Q(〈s,mR〉, aH) =
∑
aR∈A
p(aR|〈s,mR〉)
[
R(s, aH , aR)
+γ
∑
s′∈S
T (s′|s, aH , aR)V (〈s′,mR〉)
]
(2)
Following work in inverse reinforcement learning on es-
timating parameters of the Q-function from actions (Ra-
machandran and Amir 2007), we model the human’s ac-
tion selection as exponentially weighted toward actions with
higher expected reward:
p(aH |〈s,mR〉) = 1Z eQ(〈s,mR〉,aH) (3)
where Z is a normalizing factor.
We use this estimate along with an assumption of station-
arity of belief (i.e., the human is not actively updating their
mental model of the agent or reward function during this in-
teraction) to obtain the likelihood of the observed trajectory:
p(ξ|mR) = Π(si,aiH)p(aiH |〈si,mR〉) (4)
In order to do inference on the human’s mental model
type, we reverse this probability:
p(mR|ξ) = p(ξ|mR)p(mR)p(ξ) (5)
Since we use a uniform prior on all model types, for a
given ξ, the most likely model can be found by finding the
model that maximizes the probability of the observed tra-
jectory. Using the iterative update implied by Eq. 4, we can
update our estimate of the human’s mental model type as we
observe new actions during an interaction.
Joint Inference of Human Mental Model and
Reward
The prior section assumes full knowledge of the human’s
reward function in calculating the state-action value func-
tion. However, in many cases, we may not know either the
human’s mental model of the agent or the human’s goal. In
these cases, we can jointly reason over both possible mental
models and possible goals.
To do this, let us assume we have some set of possible
goals, φ ∈ Φ, that are used to parameterize the human’s re-
ward function: Rφ(s, aH , aR). We denote the state-action
value function for a particular goal as Qφ(〈s,mR〉, aH).
Rewriting Eq. 3 and Eq. 4 with Qφ(〈s,mR〉, aH) produces
the probability of a trajectory jointly conditioned on model
and goal:
p(ξ|mR, φ) = 1ZξΠ(si,aiH)eQφ(〈s
i,mR〉,aiH) (6)
This gives us the joint probability of model type and goal:
p(mR, φ|ξ) = p(ξ|mR,φ)p(mR,φ)p(ξ) (7)
This joint probability can be used to find either the prob-
ability of model type or goal by marginalizing out the other
variable. In our experiment, we marginalize across a discrete
set of model types to find the probability of a goal from an
observed trajectory:
p(φ|ξ) =∑mR∈M p(mR, φ|ξ) (8)
Evaluation
We conducted a 4 × 1 within-subjects study to collect data
on how humans incorporate mental models of autonomous
agents into planning. We recruited 102 participants from
Mechanical Turk for this study. Turkers were required to
have at least a 90% approval rate, and we limited the par-
ticipants to U.S. IP addresses to limit language translation
issues with our experiment instructions. During the exper-
iment, participants control an avatar that moves through a
grid-world in order to reach a designated goal. This grid-
world contains a second agent as well: a virtual “robot”
agent with which the participant is required to avoid colli-
sions. This grid-world and the interface used by participants
is shown in Fig. 1. This task is meant to simulate a simple,
passive human-robot interaction in which a human needs to
move past a robot in order to continue along the human’s
intended path.
Experimental Procedure
Participants complete 5 trials per condition. For each trial,
participants are given one of three goals on the top row of
the grid world. The positions of these three possible goals
requires the participant to move their avatar past the agent,
which starts randomly in the 3x3 section directly in the mid-
dle of the grid-world. Participant and agent movements are
done in a turn-based manner at discrete time steps. There are
4 different strategies for agent movement, creating 4 condi-
tions:
Stationary Agent: In this baseline condition, the virtual agent
simply stays still for the duration of the trial.
Random Agent: The virtual agent chooses actions purely
randomly.
Fixed-Goal Agent: The virtual agent moves toward its goal,
which is at the participant’s starting location.
Chasing Agent: The virtual agent chases the participant by
choosing actions at each state that move it closer to the hu-
man agent. Equivalently, the agent moves toward a goal at
the participant’s current location.
We design our experiment to ensure that participants have
an accurate mental model of the agent before each trial be-
gins so that we can test our hypotheses using this known
mental model as the ground-truth. To accomplish this, before
each condition’s trials begins, participants are informed of
the strategy that the agent will be using to select actions. Af-
ter this, participants complete a practice trial in which they
move through the grid-world, including moving past the ap-
propriate agent used in the next set of trials. Once partici-
pants end this practice trial, they answer a single question to
ensure they correctly understand the agent’s movement strat-
egy. This question consists of displaying a sample game state
and asking the participant in which the direction the agent
would move next based on the agent type for the upcoming
trials. If participants incorrectly answer this question, they
are taken back to the description of the “robot” agent model;
this loop continues until participants answer correctly. The
purpose of this procedure is to ensure the participants are in-
ternally using the correct mental model of the agent for each
condition. Additionally, the practice trial serves to demon-
Figure 1: The grid-world game played by participants. The
participant’s character is the filled-in circle, while the robot
agent is represented by the crossed circle. The current goal is
represented as a green, filled-in square. For illustrative pur-
poses, all three possible goal locations are labeled with “G”
labels, and the three possible participant starting locations
are denoted with “S” labels.
strate the agent behavior to the participant so that they do
not act according to surprise or reflexive behavior during the
recorded trials.
If the participant collides with the agent during a trial, the
trial is reset. Participants complete 5 successful trials with
each condition before moving to the next (only trajectories
from successful trials were used in our analysis). Finally,
the ordering of conditions is randomized in order to mitigate
biasing from ordering effects.
Hypotheses
We hypothesize that our framework for Bayesian inference
of second-order mental models will enable improved esti-
mation of both a human’s view of an agent and their goal:
Hypothesis I: Given a known goal, human actions will leak
information that can be utilized by second-order mental
modeling to infer the mental model the human holds of the
agent.
Hypothesis II: Estimation of a human’s goal via marginal-
izing the joint probability of goal and agent mental model
will lead to improved estimation compared with directly es-
timating the goal while assuming the human treats the agent
merely as an obstacle.
Analysis
The purpose of our study setup is to record trajectories in
which we know the human’s mental model of the agent is
correct due to the explanation and practice period before
each trial. This allows us to test our framework’s ability to
infer this ground-truth mental model directly from the hu-
man action sequences.
First, we investigate our primary question of whether our
framework can infer the human’s mental model of the agent
from their actions by evaluating the accuracy of what our
framework judges to be the most likely model based on an
observed trajectory with a known goal. To do this, we set
uniform priors over the four agent models used for our four
conditions, then update these probabilities based on a tra-
jectory. We calculate accuracy based on whether or not the
agent model assigned the highest probability at the end of
the trajectory matches the correct model for that trial.
Second, we compare the probability assigned to the cor-
rect goal over time using our method for joint estimation of
agent model and goal compared to estimation of the goal
while assuming the human views the agent as an obstacle
(which is equivalent to using the stationary agent model at
all times). We use a discrete goal space consisting of the
three goals which we used in data collection: the top-left
corner, top-middle, and top-right corner of the grid-world.
After each action, we update and record the probability as-
signed to the correct goal by each method. The probabili-
ties are presented by the percent of the trajectory observed
rounded to 5% intervals, averaged across all trials.
Implementation Modifications for Turn-Based
Games
In our experiment, the human and agent take turns making
movements, with each able to see the results of the other’s
turn before choosing their own action. In order to accommo-
date this type of turn-based interaction into our framework,
we expand the human’s state-action value functions to in-
clude the expected next turn of the agent. Essentially, this
allows the Q-function to represent a full turn (both human
and agent move) including both the given human action and
an expectation over possible agent actions. For more com-
pact notation, we represent the value function for a agent
turn as RV , producing the following equations:
Qφ(〈s,mR〉, aH) = Rφ(s, aH , NULL)
+γ
∑
s′∈S
T (s′|s, aH , NULL)RVφ(〈s′,mR〉) (9)
where
RVφ(〈s,mR〉) =
∑
aR∈A
p(aR|〈s,mR〉)
[
Rφ(s,NULL, aR)
+γ
∑
s′∈S
T (s′|s,NULL, aR)Vφ(〈s′,mR〉)
]
(10)
Tuning the Reward Function
In order to produce the state-action value function, we need
to estimate the reward assigned to state-action pairs by par-
ticipants. To do this, we create a simple reward function with
three parameters: reward for reaching the goal G, cost per
action Ca, and discount factor γ. We set aside data from
10 participants for tuning these parameters (only the data
from the other 92 participants was used for testing), then
perform a grid search to find the parameters that maximize
the probabilities of the observed trajectories for this set of
participants. This produced the following values: G = 30,
Ca = −3, γ = 0.95.
Table 1: Accuracies of model classification from observed
trajectories.
Model Classification Accuracy
Top-1 Accuracy Top-2 Accuracy
I-POMDP State Inference 45.2% 78.5%
Chance 25.0% 50.0%
Figure 2: Confusion matrix of model classification from ob-
served trajectories.
Results
Inference of the Participant’s Robot Model from
Actions
The results of the Top-1 and Top-2 accuracy on the trajec-
tories from the 92 test participants are presented in Table
1. An improvement in classification accuracy over the accu-
racy due to chance demonstrates that the actions from par-
ticipants in our experiment do leak information about their
mental model of the agent.
Fig. 2 visualizes the confusion matrix of the top classifi-
cation for each trial (for classifications in which there is a
tie, the classification is split between all tied classes). As the
confusion matrix shows, for each true model type, the cor-
rect model type is the most common classification by our
method. Furthermore, some pairs of models are more fre-
quently misclassified than other pairs — we discuss this re-
sult in more detail below.
Estimation of the Participant’s Goal
Fig. 3 visualizes the probability assigned to the correct goal
over percent of the trajectory observed, averaged across all
trials. An initial uniform probability of the three possible
goals is assumed, which is then updated at each timestep ac-
cording to the procedure laid out previously. In both cases,
the correct goal is nearly always inferred with high confi-
dence as the human approaches the goal. Our intent in visu-
alizing these probabilities over time through the trajectories
is to examine if joint inference of the model and goal has
an effect on this inference as compared to assuming a fixed
agent location at each action step (Hypothesis 2). We found
that the two methods performed similarly, with the assumed
stationary agent slightly outperforming joint inference in ini-
tial action observations, while the joint inference method as-
signs slightly higher probabilities to the correct goal as more
actions have been observed.
Discussion
There are a few key takeaways from the results of our anal-
ysis. First, low-level actions do provide information about a
human’s mental model of a local agent, even without consid-
ering the human’s observations. This is shown through our I-
POMDP state inference method outperforming the accuracy
due to chance at classification of the participant’s ground-
truth mental model of the agent. However, our method is
not robust in this scenario; the classifier only selects the
correct model approximately half of the time. Nevertheless,
the results demonstrate that there is potential to learn these
second-order mental models from human actions around
agents such as robots, even during brief, passive interactions.
Furthermore, these second-order mental models are learned
using a model of actions as independent choices (as opposed
to considering trajectories which could implicitly encode the
behavior of the agent). This shows that information about the
participants’ view of the agent is contained directly in some
subset of individual action selections, even without taking
into account the agent’s actual movement or behavior. Thus,
we found support for Hypothesis 1, although more work is
needed to improve classification accuracy.
Second, an interesting pattern is shown by the confusion
matrix from the classification (Fig. 2). The confusion ma-
trix demonstrates that the classification errors are predomi-
nantly between the pairs of Stationary and Fixed-Goal mod-
els, and Random and Chasing models. Intuitively, these pairs
of models represent the agent which are “safe” to pass di-
rectly next to (the Stationary and Fixed-Goal models) due to
either not moving or having a pre-determined path that the
participant can easily avoid, and the agents which are “un-
safe” to pass directly adjacent to (the Random and Chasing
models) due to the potential for collision from uncertain or
hostile agent models. This clustering demonstrates the po-
tential for actions to leak information not only about spe-
cific models that the human holds about an agent, but per-
haps also higher-level information about more abstract men-
tal models that might encompass multiple specific models.
Finally, the benefit to goal inference from our method is
unclear. While our joint model and goal inference method
produces marignally (but not significantly) higher final prob-
abilities assigned to the correct goal compared with treat-
ing the agent as a fixed object in the view of the human
while modeling action probabilities, the difference is quite
small and overall the two methods perform similarly. Con-
sequently, we do not find support for Hypothesis 2. Further
testing on more complex interaction scenarios is required
to determine whether or not there is a benefit to using this
method for goal inference.
Future Work
Through this paper, we have laid out a formulation for what
we hope will be a useful way to improve understanding of
how humans view robots during an interaction. Our experi-
Figure 3: The probability assigned to the true goal by the
percent of the trajectory observed.
ment demonstrates that there is indeed information embed-
ded in low-level human actions that can be used for second-
order mental modeling. However, further work is needed to
apply these ideas to real-world human-robot interactions.
First, in this paper, we have proposed a framework for per-
forming Bayesian inference of second-order mental models
and investigated the feasibility of doing so from low-level
human actions. In order to establish this approach clearly,
we have shown this on a simple task: a fully-observable grid-
world with discrete state, action, reward, and model spaces.
Relaxing these assumptions in future work would create a
more powerful tool for understanding human actions with-
out prior knowledge of possible human mental states.
Second, while we describe and evaluate our framework
for Bayesian inference of second-order mental models in
isolation in order to study its plausibility, an implementa-
tion in a more complex task ought to combine this frame-
work with existing methods for open-loop modeling that
take into consideration a human’s observations during the in-
teraction. Thus, this framework could serve to close the loop
in an existing open-loop modeling framework. This com-
bined framework could also relax one of the assumptions
made in our formulation: that the human’s belief about the
agent’s model type is stationary. Such a framework would
first model forward propagation of belief based on the hu-
man’s observations, then update this prior by taking into ac-
count the human’s action according to our method developed
in this paper. In this way, our method and existing open-loop
modeling could be used together to utilize both human ob-
servations and human actions in updating the belief about
the human’s mental model without assuming either a certain
initial model or a stationary model.
Finally, we evaluate our framework in this paper using
a human-agent interaction scenario with greatly simplified
dynamics and interaction possibilities. While we have devel-
oped this framework with human-robot interactions in mind,
this initial study only directly demonstrates leaking of in-
formation about mental models in an online human-agent
interaction. We look forward to conducting further studies
with humans and physically-embodied robots pariticipating
in passive, teaming, and adversarial interactions in order to
further examine whether this leakage occurs and is useful in
these scenarios.
Conclusion
If humans use a Theory of Mind about robots during inter-
actions, second-order mental modeling might provide infor-
mation that could be used by robots to be aware of their ef-
fect on the people around them. We have shown that hu-
man action choices around agents in a grid-world environ-
ment do leak information about a human’s view of such an
agent. In doing so, we have provided a justification for clos-
ing the loop in open-loop mental models of humans in or-
der to take into account this information as human actions
around robots are observed.
A robot planning with an awareness of its effect on hu-
mans provides many possible benefits. For instance, such a
robot could identify errors with a human’s view of the robot
that might lead to sub-optimal interactions, then communi-
cate to fix these errors in order to improve the remainder
of the interaction. Actively assessing a human’s view of a
robot provides a path for deepening and improving under-
standing between humans and robots during human-robot
interactions.
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